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 Abstract
The problem of explaining subjectivity or sentience scientifically has been coined the 
‘Hard Problem of Consciousness’. Some postulate that an explanation is impossible 
with methods from contemporary cognitive science. In this paper, I select three of the 
most influential theories of consciousness based on a literature survey, and ask whether 
their respective theoretical solutions to the Hard Problem are supported by empirical 
evidence from research on visual consciousness, and more broadly whether empirical 
evidence favours the any of these approaches. I argue that the evidence does not warrant 
a conclusion, but that it favours viewing consciousness as an emergent property of 
global access/global neuronal networks rather than dependent upon specific brain areas. 
Sammendrag
Å forklare subjektive opplevelser vitenskapelig refereres til som ‘The Hard Problem of 
Consciousness’. Enkelte forskere og filosofer mener at en forklaring er umulig med 
metoder i fra dagens kognitive vitenskap. I denne oppgaven gjør jeg en 
litteraturundersøkelse og på bakgrunn av denne selekterer jeg tre av de mest 
inflytelsesrike teoriene om bevissthet. Videre undersøker jeg om noen av disse teoriene 
er støttet av forskning på visuell bevissthet. I oppgaven blir også bredere 
problemstillinger diskutert, som spørsmålet om hvorvidt forskningen ser ut til å 
favorisere en av tilnærmingene. Jeg argumenterer for at forskningen ikke støtter en 
konklusjon, men at det å se på bevissthet som en egenskap ved global tilgjengelighet 
eller globale nevronale nettverk er favorisert over det å tenke på bevissthet som 
avhengig av spesifikke hjerneområder
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The Hard Problem of Consciousness
 Consciousness is a familiar concept to most of us, not so much in a scientific or 
philosophical sense, but in the day to day feeling of being conscious – i.e. having 
subjective experience. Block (1995) propose that one can distinguish between Access 
(A)-consciousness which is composed of whatever information is consciously 
accessible to a person at a given moment, and hence can be verbally reported to a 
researcher, and Phenomenal (P) -consciousness which is subjective and entails a ‘what 
it is like to be‘ quality. Block (1995) claims that A-consciousness is what is studied by 
experimental psychology, while P-consciousness is largely ignored. 
 Chalmers (1995) distinguished between the easy problems of consciousness and 
the Hard Problem of consciousness. Easy problems are solvable using standard methods 
from cognitive science, either computational or neuronal. The Hard Problem on the 
other hand, is a problem that seems unsolvable when we apply methods from cognitive 
science. Chalmers mentions several examples of easy problems such as how we focus 
our attention, how we discriminate between stimuli or how we access internal states. 
Though the easy problems are far from solved, they are susceptible to explanations 
offered by cognitive models. The truly hard problem, according to Chalmers, is the 
problem of subjective experience. One of the most well-known ways of phrasing this 
particular problem is Nagel’s (1974) ‘what is it like to be a bat’. While it is possible to 
understand how the bat navigates by echolocation, it seems impossible to understand 
what it is like to orient oneself using this sensory modality. The point that both Nagel 
and Chalmers have in common, is that when brains process information there is also a 
subjective aspect to it, a ‘what it is like to be’ quality. 
DISCUSSION OF THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
5
 The mystery surrounding subjective experiences, also known as the Hard 
Problem of consciousness, primarily take two forms. The first one is the mystery of why 
subjective experience should exist at all. For example, the possibility of the existence of 
a human with all the capabilities that you would expect from a conscious human being, 
but operating as an automaton with no subjective experiences, could be argued 
(Chalmers, 2004). This philosophical-zombie thought experiment has been criticized 
(Carruthers, 2007; Dennett, 1988; 1991; 1995; Harnad, 1994), for being logically 
possible, but metaphysically impossible. Whether or not philosophical zombies are 
metaphysically possible, will in turn effect how the Hard Problem is resolved. If you 
accept the possibility of philosophical zombies, you must reject physicalism (Howell & 
Alter, 2009), which in turn will lead you to accept a form of dualism. I will discuss 
zombies and related thought experiments in relation to the theories of consciousness 
later on, as this represents an a priori position on the Hard Problem (Van Gulick, 2007). 
 The second part of the Hard Problem concerns how subjective experience is 
connected to human nervous systems. This is what Descartes (1641) was thinking about 
when he famously wrote that ‘res extensa‘ and ‘res cogitans‘ are two different 
substances that communicate through the pineal gland. There are now a number of 
studies that link consciousness to certain patterns of brain activity (Mormann & Koch, 
2007; Rees et. al., 2002; Tononi & Koch, 2008). Finding the neural correlates of 
consciousness (NCC) is a promising project, but a number of questions still remain. 
 Thus the Hard Problem, from here referred to as HP- consists of two questions. 
A: How is it that at least some organisms (e.g. humans) have subjective experiences? B: 
What is the connection between subjectivity and the physical systems known as brains?
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  Assuming that having a subjective experience of an inner life and the outside 
world is an important feature of their lives for most people, it would be troubling if 
Block’s (1995) claim that A-consciousness is the only thing that is studied in 
experimental psychology, turns out to be true. Where Block perceives a hole in the 
knowledge base created by experimental psychology, Chalmers (1995) goes further and 
asserts that explaining how we have subjective experiences is impossible with cognitive 
or biological models. It would therefore be of great value to find out whether or not 
Chalmers’ proposistion is plausible. If this explanatory gap, which is addressed by the 
HP, is unbridgeable, we would need a paradigmatic shift to incorporate the inexplicable 
phenomenality of human experience. 
   Regardless of - or perhaps because of -  the explanatory gap addressed by the 
HP, and the attention (Churchland & Churchland, 1998; Dennett, 1996b; Gray, 2004; 
Libet, 1996; Varela, 1996) and support (McGinn, 2000; Shear, 1999) that the HP has 
received, a number of psychological theories of consciousness have been formulated. 
However, the causal role of consciousness has been debated (e.g. Block, 1980; 
Chalmers, 2004). Views on this subject are influenced by whether one views subjective 
experience as something different from the physical world (Baars, 2007). Despite 
questions relating to the causal role of consciousness a multitude of philosophers and 
scientists have adopted a naturalistic approach (e.g. Crick & Koch, 1990, Dennett, 
1991). In these approaches the empirical status of the concept of consciousness is 
considered acceptable, as long as it is defined carefully.    
 With a basis in this assumption, I discuss how some of the leading psychological 
theories of consciousness address the HP. Having introduced the HP and its central 
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relevance to a science of psychology in this section, the structure of the rest of the paper 
is as follows. The next section of this paper summarises a survey where I rank 
contemporary theories of consciousness in terms of how often they are mentioned in 
journal titles, keywords and abstracts. On this basis I select influential theories for 
further discussion in the paper. This is followed by a section where I discuss how some 
of the leading psychological theories of consciousness approach HP of consciousness, 
and a section where I discuss predictions that should follow from these approaches and 
ask whether these predictions can in principle be distinguished. In the second part of 
this paper, I ask whether work within one major area of consciousness research - 
namely work on visual consciousness - appears in practice to support one or other 
approach to the HP. The first section within this part presents a justification for focusing 
on visual consciousness as a test area for approaches to the HP, and provides an 
overview of work in this area. The next section then asks whether work in several areas 
of visual consciousness is consistent or inconsistent with proposed approaches to the 
HP, and whether it selectively supports one or other approach. Finally, I discuss the 
implications of the findings for the concept of the Hard Problem of consciousness. 
Selection of Theories of Consciousness
 Due to space considerations this paper will not address all the contemporary 
theories of consciousness which are relevant to the HP. Instead a subset of the most 
influential theories were selected on the basis of a literature search, as described below. 
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Selection Method for Theories
 To narrow the initial search, a list of theories of consciousness was first based on 
the contemporary theories of consciousness discussed in the Blackwell Companion to 
Consciousness (Schneider & Velmans, 2007). As a second step this list was compared 
with the list of theories of consciousness in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Van Gulick, 2011). In this encyclopedia the theories are categorised as metaphysical 
theories if they are overarching theories that offer answers to the relationship between 
consciousness and the physical world. They are also categorised as specific theories if 
more detailed accounts of consciousness are given. This provided a framework for 
exclusion, as metaphysical theories were considered too broad for the purposes of this 
paper. Thus the following well known metaphysical theories, which offer explanations 
of the relationship between the physical world and consciousness rather than the 
specific mechanisms surrounding consciousness, were excluded: mysterianism 
(McGinn, 2004; Rowland, 2007), naturalistic dualism (Chalmers, 2007), biological 
naturalism (Searle, 2007) and reflexive monism (Velmans, 2007).
 Representationalist theories (Seager & Bourget, 2007) are mainly concerned 
with the relationship between representations and phenomenality. Though not fitting the 
metaphysical theory category, representationalist theories refer to an overarching class 
of theories. Three higher-order theories (Carruthers, 2007), which are a specific class of 
representationalist theories, were included instead of the broader representationalist 
theories, due to the fact that they offer reductive explanations of phenomenal 
consciousness: the Higher-Order Thought Theory (Rosenthal, 1990),  Inner-Sense 
theory (Armstrong, 1968; Lycan 1995), and Dual-Content theory (Carruthers, 2003) 
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 Lastly, there was one set of specific theories, namely quantum mechanical 
theories (Hameroff & Penrose, 1996; Stapp, 2007) that was excluded. There are four 
reasons for this: Based on an interpretation of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, one 
central premise of the most well known quantum mechanical theory - the Penrose-
Hameroff theory -  is that mental processes cannot be algorithmical, and that 
consciousness arises due to quantum incoherence in the microtubules of the neurons 
(Penrose, 1994). Evidence from studies of anaesthesized subjects suggest that the proper 
functioning of microtubules are necessary for consciousness (Hameroff, 1998). On the 
other hand, there might be many things that are necessary for consciousness to arise. 
This and the critical reception of the argument based on Gödels theorem (Blackmore, 
2010; Grush & Churchland, 1995; Putnam, 1994) suggest that quantum mechanical 
theories of consciousness are much debated, which makes it hard for those who are not 
acquainted with the conceptual language to make judgements about the validity and 
empirical status of the theories. Secondly, there are few predictions that have been made 
from proposing that consciousness arises from quantum incoherence in the 
microtubules, although the future possibility of comparing microtubule activity in 
conscious and unconscious states remains. Thirdly, quantum mechanical theories are 
vulnerable to a post hoc fallacy, because their central premise could be caricatured as 
saying that since consciousness seems so inexplicable, we must explain it using 
something inexplicable. In this way, quantum mechanical theories of consciousness are 
replacing the mystery of subjective experience with the mystery of quantum coherence. 
Lastly, the quantum theory approach to consciousness falls beyond the conventional 
cognitive neuroscience focus of the current paper.
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  The theories that were included were the Multiple Drafts Model (Dennett, 1991) 
Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988), Higher-Order Thought Theory (Rosenthal, 
1990), Inner-Sense Theory (Armstrong, 1968; Lycan, 1995), Dual-Content Theory 
(Carruthers, 2003)  Intermediate Level Theory (Prinz, 2007), and  Information 
Integration Theory (Tononi, 2007).
 Some of the theories mentioned above also have other names that are used 
interchangeably those used in this paper. For example, Dual-Content Theory is 
sometimes referred to in the literature as Dispositionalist Higher-Order Thought Theory 
and Intermediate Level Theory is sometimes referred to as Attended-Intermediate-
Representation (AIR)-theory. When searching for theories with multiple names, all the 
known labels for that theory were used.
Selection Method for Journals
 A preliminary search was conducted within the 50 top ranking psychology 
journals in terms of JCR impact rating (University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, 
2013). In addition to these, two more journals were added based on the mind-science 
foundations list of journals frequently reporting scientific findings in consciousness 
research (Mind-Science Foundation, 2013). These were considered high impact journals 
within the consciousness research fields. The initial list of journals was thus based 
mostly on JCR impact rating, but with two journals that were included due to the 
endorsement from mind-science foundation. The names of the selected theories were 
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used as search terms that could appear anywhere in an article, and there was no 
publication date constraint. 
 The preliminary survey revealed that Behavioral and Brain Sciences had the 
most hits (120), followed by Journal of Consciousness Studies (99), Consciousness and 
Cognition (96), Trends in Cognitive sciences (20), Neuropsychologia (11), Cognition 
(8), Cognitive Psychology (7), Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (3), Annual Review 
of Psychology (2), Psychological Review (2), Journal of Psychiatric Research (2), 
Psychological Bulletin (1), Personality and Social Psychology Review (1), Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry (1), Journal of Experimental Psychology - General 
(1), Psychological Medicine (1), Current opinion in Psychiatry (1), Developmental 
psychology (1). The remaining 34 journals had no hits for any of the theories. 
 The seven journals with the most hits in the preliminary search were selected for 
the final survey: i.e., Consciousness and Cognition, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, Behavioral and Brain Science, Neuropsychologia, 
Cognition and Cognitive Psychology. The final survey was conducted by searching for 
articles that mentioned the target theories in their abstract, keywords or  titles.
Results
 The Global Workspace Theory was mentioned in most abstracts, titles and/or 
keywords (28), followed by the Higher-Order Thought Theory (10), the Multiple Drafts 
Model (6), the information integration theory (4) and the Intermediate Level theory (1). 
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The Inner-Sense Theory and Dual-Content Theory were not mentioned in any abstracts, 
titles or keywords in these journals. The journal of consciousness studies has the most 
hits (19), followed by Consciousness and Cognition (14) Behavioral and Brain sciences 
(9), Trends in Cognitive sciences (5), Cognition (2) and Cognitive Psychology (1). 
Neuropsychologia had no hits for any of the theories (see Table 1)
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Journal MDM GWT HOT ILT IIT IST DCT Sum
Consciousness and 
Cognition
2 7 1 1 3 0 0 14
Trends in 
cognitive sciences




2 12 4 0 1 0 0 19
Neuropsychologia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




2 4 3 0 0 0 0 9
Cognitive 
Psychology
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Sum 6 28 10 1 4 0 0 49
Table 1. Number of times that the theory appeared in an abstract, title and/or keyword. From the left 
MDM: Multiple Drafts Model, GWT: Global workspace theory, HOT: Higher-Order Thought Theory, 
ILT: Intermediate Level Theory, IIT: Information Integration Theory, IST: Inner-Sense Theory, DCT: 
Dual-Content Theory
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Implications
 The Global Workspace Theory appeared three times as often as the runner up, 
the Higher-Order Thought theory in abstracts, keywords and titles, with the Multiple 
Drafts Model a further five hits behind Higher-Order Thought Theory. The hits from the 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, which is the journal in the survey with the highest JCR-
impact factor, show the same  tendency as the survey as a whole. Including the results 
from the other journals with a high JCR-impact factor,  Trends in Cognitive science, 
Cognition and Cognitive Psychology, the ranking of the theories held constant. These 
results suggest that the hits from Journal of Consciousness studies and Consciousness 
and Cognition, which are significant journals in their field, correspond with hits from 
the higher ranking journals, indicating that the findings from this survey reflect the 
mainstream tendency.
  Based on these results, the Global Workspace Theory (GWT), the Higher-Order 
Thought Theory (HOT), and the Multiple Drafts Model (MDM), were selected as the 
leading theories for the focus of this paper, both in offering a specific perspective on the 
HP, and in being evaluated in light of empirical evidence from research on visual 
consciousness. I will briefly outline these theories in the following section, and 
summarise as well as compare their empirical predictions in the next. 
The Global Workspace Theory
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 The GWT describes conscious events as happening in a metaphorical ‘theatre of 
consciousness’ (Blackmore, 2010). This view emphasises the large difference between 
the very few items that are in consciousness, and the vast amount of unconscious neural 
processes that are going on at any time (Baars, 2007). The perspective from GWT holds 
that this can be thought of in terms of a theatre where consciousness acts as the spotlight 
on the stage, which is directed to different places by attentional processes. The 
conscious spotlight is surrounded by events at the fringes that are only vaguely 
conscious. The audience sits in the unconscious darkness and receives information from 
whatever is lit up by the unconscious spotlight, and behind the stage there are various 
unconscious processes that shape the events happening in the spotlight. This ‘theatre 
metaphor‘ is based on a blackboard architecture, where consciousness is seen as a 
limited capacity workspace with flexibility to solve novel problems, and the 
unconscious processes are thought of as more specialized (Baars, 1988). The use of the 
metaphor ‘Theatre of Consciousness’, ‘Global Workspace’, or ‘blackboard architecture’ 
in describing consciousness, does not imply that consciousness must be localized to one 
area of the brain where everything comes together (Baars, 2002). 
 The GWT provides a functional explanation for conscious experience, in 
viewing consciousness as a limited-capacity global workspace (Baars, 1988; 2002; 
2007). The main assumptions are that while unconscious mental processes mainly are 
specialized, conscious processes are not. Consciousness is viewed as the blackboard of 
the mind, where bits of information can be held, manipulated, and fed back to more 
specialized unconscious information processing modules. This provides a functional 
answer to question A in the HP (How is it that some organisms have subjective 
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experiences?). It does not give us an answer to question B (What is the connection 
between subjectivity and the physical systems known as brains?). 
 The Neuronal Global Workspace Theory (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001) however, 
is similar to the GWT in the sense that it has a basis in the global workspace 
architecture from the GWT. In line with this it is considered a submodel of this theory 
(Baars, 2007). It also assumes the existence of unconscious processors that compete for 
access to the limited capacity of the global workspace, but the neuronal GWT also 
focuses on the neural foundation of consciousness. According to this view, subjective 
experience is dependent upon long range circuits involving the prefrontal cortex, 
anterior cingulate and connecting areas (Dehaene et. al., 2006). If information enters 
into connection with the long range circuitry it can be widely broadcasted to other brain 
areas, thus creating a global availability that results in the possibility of verbal or non-
verbal report and is experienced as a conscious state. The neuronal GWT hypothesize 
that subjective experience results from the creation of a global availability of 
information due to long range circuitry in the brain. Thus the GWT provides a possible 
answer to question A and the neuronal GWT a possible answer to question B. 
 GWT is an umbrella term for many Global Workspace sub-models. Some of 
these are outlined by Baars (1988; 2007), and some by other authors (e.g. Dehaene & 
Changeux, 2000; Dehaene, et. al., 2001; Dehaene, et. al. 2003; Shanahan and Baars, 
2005). While the sub-models make specific predictions, there are some general 
theoretical predictions that are implied by a global workspace architecture. The most 
important one is the conscious access hypothesis, where it is theorized that 
consciousness is a function that enables the integration and mobilization of separate 
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brain functions that are otherwise independent (Baars, 2002). The predictions that 
follow from the GWT will outlined in the next part of this paper, after the other theories 
have been descrbed. Thus comparing the different predictions as well as describing 
them. 
The Higher Order Thought Theory
 There are a variety of HOT theories (Carruthers, 2007), but only the actualist-
HOT theory, defended by Rosenthal (1990), had enough hits in the survey to be 
included in this paper. Therefore, when I refer to HOT in this paper, I will be referring 
to Rosenthal’s version. According this version of HOT, a person is conscious of her 
mental states if she has a higher-order thought about that mental state (Rosenthal, 1990; 
Van Gullick, 2011). 
 Before I outline the predictions that can be drawn from HOT,  I will briefly 
describe the assumptions that form the basis of the theory, starting with the distinctions 
that are drawn in HOT between different types of consciousness. Creature 
consciousness is the first type, and it is posessed by creatures who are awake and 
sentient. Assuming that wakefulness and sentience are biological features of an 
organism, this does not seem to be something that directly addresses the HP (Rosenthal, 
1990). The second type of consciousness is transitive consciousness, which is 
consciousness that takes an object, e.g. consciousness of something. Thirdly, state 
consciousness or intransitive consciousness is a type of consciousness that involves a 
meta-mentality. In this sense there is a difference between wanting, for example, an 
apple and being conscious of one’s wanting an apple (Droege, 2005). It is this type of 
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consciousness that is primarily addressed in HOT theory and from now on and as long 
as I am discussing HOT, when I refer to consciousness I imply state consciousness.
 As they are based on the distinction between transitive and state consciousness, 
all HOTs - including Rosenthal’s, are based on the transivity principle (TP) (Rosenthal, 
2008; Rosenthal & Weisberg, 2008), a principle stating that a conscious state is 
experienced as conscious when you are aware of the state in a suitable way. At first 
glance, this might sound tautological and simplistic, but it does have some important 
implications. It implies that if a person has a thought, perception or a feeling but is 
wholly unaware of it, it would not be a conscious state. Thus, a conscious state 
according to the TP would be dependent on the persons access to that state. 
 As mentioned earlier, HOT assumes that a higher-order thought about a mental 
state is sufficient to make that mental state conscious. Still, there are some important 
factors that must be present for a person to be conscious of her mental states. As well as 
stating these factors, I will give an example for each of them as this will make them 
more tangible, hopefully easing the transition into the section where the predictions are 
discussed. First of all, state consciousness is dependent upon a sense of immediacy 
(Byrne, 1997). When a person is conscious of her wanting an apple, she is not inferring 
it from other information nor is she observing it. She is not thinking ‘I feel hungry, and I 
have not eaten anything with a lot of dietary fibres in a while, I should grab an apple’. 
There are no conscious observations or presumptions that mediate between a mental 
state and the higher-order thought. Secondly, a mental state is conscious by having a 
representational relation to a higher-order thought (Droege, 2005). It is not conscious 
due to an intrinsic property. When the person from the previous example is conscious of 
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her hunger for apples, it is conscious because of the relation the representation of her 
hunger for apples has to a higher-order thought. Thirdly, a higher-order thought must 
occur at approximately the same time as the mental state it represents, and it must 
assert, in a strong manner, that you are in a particular mental state. For the woman with 
the hunger for apples to be conscious of this aspect of her state of being, the higher-
order thought about her hunger for apples must occur at roughly the same time as her 
bodily hunger occurs. And it cannot be her speculating or hoping that what she is 
experiencing is a hunger for apples it has to be an assertion of her hunger for apples. 
Fourth, it should be noted that a higher order thought is not equivalent to an intentional 
introspective attempt on the part of the subject. A higher-order thought about the higher-
order thought would be needed if a higher-order thought was to be available for 
introspection (Rosenthal, 2000). Lastly, a minimal self concept is required for a higher-
order thought to occur, due to the self-reference that is made in higher-order thought. 
The woman with the craving for apples would have to know that she was the one with 
this want, and not anyone else.
 HOT is different from most other theories of consciousness due to its simplicity. 
It does not postulate any special organs for consciousness, nor does it postulate any 
particular function for consciousness, like adopting a stance where conscious processing 
has an advantage over unconscious processing, for example when handling novel 
information. However, Rosenthal (2008, pp. 830-831) explicitly writes that this 
conclusion about the function of consciousness does not imply epiphenomenalism. He 
goes on to write that the absence of function does not mean that consciousness is devoid 
of a causal role on other psychological processes, but that this causal role is too limited, 
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diverse or neutral with regards to the interests of the organism to have any significant 
effect on the function of consciousness. In line with this, HOT appears to be agnostic 
with regard to the function of consciousness, as Lau and Rosenthal (2011) writes: 
 «The higher-order view, by contrast, is neutral about whether conscious 
awareness adds significant utility or immediate impact on behavior and task 
performance. This is because the view assumes that task performance in most 
perceptual and cognitive tasks depends mainly on first-order rather than higher-order 
representations. Because conscious awareness can differ even if all first-order 
representations remain completely unchanged, such awareness itself might serve little 
function» (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011, pp. 366-367)
 Avoiding any predictions about the function of consciousness makes the theory 
more defensible in Rosenthal’s view (Lau & Rosenthal 2011). Coherent with this line of 
reasoning, HOT simply purports to outline the pre-requisites and mechanisms that 
makes something conscious. If we were to return to question A of the HP (How is it that 
at least some organisms, e.g. humans, have subjective experiences?), the answer from 
HOT would simply be, because humans have higher-order thoughts with a 
representational relation to their experiences. If we return to question B of the HP (What 
is the connection between subjectivity and brains?), HOT predicts that changed 
awareness is associated with changes in the activity of the prefrontal and parietal 
regions of the brain (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011), though it is stressed that not any changes 
in activity would be sufficient for change in awareness and that higher-order 
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representation probably represents a small sub-set of such an activity. HOT’s stance on 
the HP is thus more descriptive than the GWT’s.  
The Multiple Drafts Model
 Dennett (1991) presents two views of consciousness, one of which disputes the 
approaches that many scientists and philosophers have adopted in trying to account for 
consciousness. The other view is his own perspective on consciousness, the Multiple 
Drafts Model (MDM), which draws on models from evolutionary theory, as well as 
psychology, anthropology, biology, neuroscience and artificial intelligence research. The 
proposal of the MDM is that our brains consist of a number of multiple channels with 
specialist circuits that try, in disorganized parallelity (Dennett, 1991, pp. 253-254), to do 
their different tasks, creating “multiple drafts” as they go. These drafts are fragments of 
narrative, and while most of the drafts are short lived, and only modulate current 
activity, some are promoted to other useful roles, by a virtual machine in the brain, 
which operates as a serial processor. This virtual machine arises from a coalition of 
specialist circuits, and its seriality is not hard wired in the brain (Dennett, 1991, pp. 
253-254), but is an effect of the succession of coalitions of specialist circuits coming 
together. The specialised circuits outside of this virtual machine normally operate as a 
parallel processor, as parallel processes are seen as an important attribute of the brain. 
 Many of the specialist circuits are shared with our pre-historic ancestors, but are 
opportunistically enlisted to new roles, even if they originally evolved because they 
increased the likelihood of detecting environmental hazards, like spoiled food or 
predators. The reason why the result is not more anarchic, is that the central tendency 
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that is imposed on this activity is a product of evolution, culture or individual 
microhabits and hence a design feature (Dennett, 1991, pp. 253-254). Hence, some of 
the design features are innate, and thus shared with other animals, other parts of the 
design features are augmented, undermined or mediated by microhabits developed by 
the individual and pre-designed microhabits that are culturally transmitted. In later work 
the metaphor of multiple drafts has been replaced with the metaphor of “fame in the 
brain”, but the underlying point remains the same. Consciousness is not a datable event, 
like something being transmitted via a medium (e.g. televised), it is a gradual process, 
presicely like fame (Dennett, 1996a).
 Central to the MDM (Dennett, 1991) is also that we need to think differently 
about consciousness, and to be able to do this, we need to get some of the common 
misunderstandings about consciousness out of the way: One of these is the powerful 
day to day intuition about what Dennett calls a Cartesian Theatre. This is the familiar 
idea that various functional modules in our brains like perception, working memory and 
attention perform the basic legwork of making information understandable through 
processing before they present the information to our conscious selves. Dennett (1991) 
lists several reasons why this cannot be true, one of the most persuasive ones being that 
there are several problems with trying to locate the point of view of the individual, 
within the individual. 
 Other powerful intuitions about consciousness include the intuition of a singular 
narrative stream, and the intuition of the existence of an author (Dennett, 1991). The 
intuition about the existence of a singular narrative stream arises when the parallell 
processes are probed in one way or the other, for example, the contents of consciousness 
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can be probed as we engage in conversations about our experiences or when we make 
judgements about what our experiences are (Blackmore, 2010). From these everyday 
activities the illusion that there is a single stream of consciousness arises. The intuition 
about the existence of an author of this single stream of consciousness is according to 
Dennett, also an illusion. This illusion comes into play when the contents of 
consciousness are made clearer by probing the parallel processes at various points. This 
too happens as we engage in our everyday routine of talking about our experiences and 
making up our minds about what they are and how we should act on them. 
 Both the intuition about a singular stream and an author of consciousness are 
illusions, but the argument so far does make references to ‘probing parallel processes’. 
Due to this an observer can be inferred, but Dennett escapes the problem of defining a 
point of view within the observer, by claiming that the observer is a skein of narratives 
(Blackmore, 2010) - or a «centre of narrative gravity» in his own words, thus drawing 
on the concepts he developed in «The Intentional Stance» (Dennett, 1989).
  The MDM is a functionalist model. Dennett (1991) claims that any model that 
does not solve the problems of what functions consciousness performs, is not a 
satisfying model. To question A  (How is it that at least some organisms (e.g. humans) 
have subjective experiences?) of the HP, it is implied that the subjective qualities of 
experience only accessible to the individual must be analyzed in a functional manner 
and broken down in complex dispositional traits distributed in space and time in the 
brain (Dennett, 2001). In other words, as long as you think about consciousness in the 
right way, you will come to see that there is no HP, which is in line with previous 
critique of the concept phenomenal consciousness or qualia (Dennett, 1988). Turning to 
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question B of the HP  (What is the connection between subjectivity and the physical 
systems known as brains?), the view from MDM is that consciousness is like fame in 
the brain (Dennett, 1996a). At any given time the information that is processed by the 
largest population of specialist circuits is conscious. Viewing the answers to question A 
and B, in relation to each other, the MDM holds that the HP is an exaggerated way of 
phrasing the problem of subjectivity, and that consciousness is a ‘virtual 
machine’ (Dennett, 1991, pp. 253) that shapes information processing in the mind.
 The MDM was intended to be a novel way of understanding consciousness, 
though Dennett (1991, pp 254-255) concedes that it borrows heavily from other theories 
of consciousness. The idea that there is no homunculus in the brain was endorsed by 
many scientists and philosophers at the time, and so was the idea that the brain works as 
a parallel processor (Schneider, 2007).  Though this might be the case, the MDM was 
simply intended to be a sketch of how a model of consciousness could be conceived 
without a Cartesian Theatre (Dennett, 1991). However, the model has a set of specific 
predictions built into it, but any specific model that honors the key propositions of the 
MDM could in principle be called a Multiple Drafts Model (Dennett & Akin, 2008) 
Predictions from the Theories of Consciousness
 As shown in table 2, there are some similarities between the HOT, GWT and 
MDM. All of the theories claim that conscious awareness in some ways involves 
prefrontal regions (Baars, 2002; Dennett, 1991; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). Though the 
details surrounding this are different between the theories. The HOT predicts that 
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conscious awareness is dependent upot prefrontal regions, as this is where the higher-
order thoughts arise. Both the GWT and MDM also predict the involvement of 
prefrontal regions in consciousnes, but not a dependence upon these regions. Hence 
they are differentiated between, as the prediction that is made by the GWT and the 
MDM, is that consciousness is an emergent property of global neuronal networks 
(Baars, 2002; Dennett, 2001).
 Another difference - which also is between the GWT and MDM on the one hand 
and the HOT on the other, concerns whether they assign a functional role to 
consciousness. The HOT does not assign any functional role to consciousness (Lau & 
Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 2008). The GWT and MDM however, attribute a functional 
role to consciousness. This functional role is the integration and mobilisation of various 
brain resources. In the MDM this is phrased as a ‘coalition of specialist circuits coming 
together’ (Dennett, 1991, pp. 253) whereas in the GWT this is phrased as ‘a global 
workspace’ or ‘blackboard architecture’ (Baars, 1988; 2002; 2007). 
 Similar for all of the theories is that they propose the self as the dominant 
context of experience. In the HOT, this self reference is theorized to be related to an 
innate capacity, a «theory of mind» turned inwards (Droege, 2005; Rosenthal, 1990). 
Comparable to this, the GWT holds that the self is a group of ‘executive interpreters’ 
located in the frontal cortex (Baars, 1988;2007). While the proposition from the MDM 
is that the self is an abstraction, created by a vast number of attributions and 
interpretations that have constructed the biography of a person. This abstraction is 
referred to as ‘the centre of narrative gravity (Dennett, 1991, pp. 427-428) and forms the 
central context around new experiences that are attributed and interpreted.
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 Though the theories share the prediction about self reference, both the MDM and 
the GWT differ from the HOT in predicting that consciousness is a graded phenomenon 
(Baars, 1988; 2007; Dennett, 1991; Dennett & Akins, 2008). With basis in the MDM 
and GWT it would make no sense to ask when something became conscious. The 
catchphrase that consciousness is similar to ‘fame in the brain’ (Dennett, 1996) alludes 
to this point. This catchphrase also points to the sixth theoretical prediction, which the 
MDM and GWT also share. That consciousness is a spatially and temporally distributed 
set of processes, which again hints at consciousness arising due to a mobilization and 
integration of brain resources. HOT however, with its emphasis on prefrontal areas (Lau 
& Rosenthal, 2011) and the mechanism of something becoming conscious when a 
higher-order thought has a representational relation to a mental state (Rosenthal, 1990), 
does not make predictions regarding a spatial and temporal distribution of 
consciousness. Neither does it predict that consciousness is a graded phenomenon; a 
higher-order thought with a representational relation to a mental state either exists, or it 
does not. 
 Lastly, the HOT makes one more theoretical prediction that it does not share 
with the MDM and GWT: That consciousness emerges as a result of a representational 
relation between a higher-order thought, and a mental state (Rosenthal, 1990). Higher-
order thoughts are located in the    prefrontal area of the brain. (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011)
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Table 2. Comparison of Theoretical predictions from GWT, HOT and MDM. X indicates positive, - 
indicates negative. Based on the following sources: The predictions drawn from the MDM are based on 
Dennett (1991, pp. 253-254, 464-468; Dennett, 1996) and Dennett & Akins (2008). Whereas the 
predictions made by the HOT are on based articles (Byrne 1997; Lau & Rosenthal 2011; Rosenthal 2000) 
and relevant book chapters (Blackmore 2010; Carruthers, 2007; Droege, 2005; Rosenthal, 1990; Van 
Gulick, 2011). Lastly, the predictions that the GWT make are from articles (Baars, 2002; Dehaene and 
Changeux, 2000; Dehaene et. al., 2001; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et. al., 2003; Dehaene et. 
al., 2006) Franklin, 2003; Shanahan and Baars, 2005), books (Baars, 1988) and relevant book chapters 
(Baars, 2007)
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 The theoretical predictions in table 2. have two major themes which directly 
feeds back to the HP, one concerns question A (e.g. how is it that some organisms have 
subjective experiences?) of the HP. This is touched upon by the question of whether 
consciousness is assigned a functional role. On this question the answer from the MDM 
and the GWT is ‘yes’, whereas HOT does not propose any function for consciousness 
(Rosenthal, 2008). However, if consciousness should be shown to have a function, this 
would not in itself falsify the HOT as HOT is agnostic towards the function of 
consciousness (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). 
 The other theme in table 2. is related to question B of the HP (What is the 
connection between subjectivity and the physical systems known as brains?), and 
concerns how consciousness is related to activity in the brain. In contrast to the former 
theme where the GWT and MDM made a stronger claim. The stronger claim with 
regards to consciousness and brain activity is made by the HOT, which proposes that 
activity in the prefrontal areas are a prerequisite for consciousness (Lau & Rosenthal, 
2011). The MDM and GWT however, suggest that consciousness arises due to global 
neuronal networks (Baars, 2007; Dennett, 1991) that likely also involves frontal areas. 
The GWT for example does hold that the ‘self’ is the dominant context of experience, 
and that the ‘self’ is a cluster of ‘executive interpreters’ (Baars, 1988) located in the 
frontal cortex. Something that implies that a degree of frontal activity is predicted in 
conscious experience. However, this is essentially different from proposing that frontal 
activity is a prerequisite for conscious experience. 
 Summarised there are four competing hypothesis directly linked to the two 
aspects of the HP. For simplicity I shall use the letter A to refer to the predictions 
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relavant to question A of the HP, and the letter B to refer to predictions relevant to 
question B of the HP:
A1) Consciousness has a function: Mobilisation and integration of brain resources     
       (MDM/GWT). 
A2) Consciousness probably does not have a function (HOT). 
B1) Consciousness is dependent upon activity in the prefrontal cortex (HOT). 
B2) Consciousness is an emergent property of global neuronal networks (GWT/MDM). 
 
 These four competing hypothesis which directly adress the HP are the focus of 
the rest of this paper. In the next section I will provide a justification for chosing visual 
consciousness as a test field, before I summarise relevant empirical evidence and 
discuss it in relation to the competing hypothesis.  
A Justification for Using Visual Consciousness as a Test Field
 Visual consciousness is by many scientists viewed as a field that can inform the 
understanding of consciousness (e.g. Engel, et. al., 1999; Sheinberg & Logothetis 1997; 
Zeki & Bartel, 1999 ). The advantages that this area has over others include: (1) 
Awareness being linked to an outside stimulus with a specific set of reactions associated 
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with it over a series of trials; (2) Visual experience entails a ‘what it is like’ quality - 
indeed, it has been used by philosophers in thought experiments (e.g. inverted qualia, 
and absent qualia thought experiments, Block, 1980); (3) Visual systems among many 
species of vertebrates are relatively similar which makes animal models possible (As 
opposed to studying intentionality or abstract thinking).; (4) Vision is assumed to be 
central to how we orient ourselves and form spatial maps over the environment, so it 
arguably plays a larger role here than our auditory, olfactory and tactile sensory 
systems; (5) Lastly, with the current methodology, the visual consciousness field is one 
of the few fields where consciousness explicitly is treated as a variable. 
 This last point is particularly important when comparing the competing 
hypothesis. The evidence reviewed here will have to shed light on the relationship 
between function and consciousness to inform question A of the HP. It will also have to 
illuminate the relationship between consciousness and neural activity to have any 
bearing on question B of the HP.
Structure for Discussion of Findings
  Before entering a more detailed discussion of relevant findings from studies of 
visual consciousness, I clarify one basic structure of my discussion.
 First, to address the relationship between function and consciousness I draw on 
evidence from studies of neurological patients with lesions to their striate cortices that 
have blind fields corresponding to the field that is retinotopically mapped by the 
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lesioned area (Cowey & Stoerig, 1991). The phenomenon of blindsight refers to these 
patients being able, for example, to grasp and manipulate objects in their subjectively 
blind field (Weiskrantz & Weiskrantz, 1986). This phenomenon will be discussed in 
relation to the competing hypothesis addressing question A of the HP.   
 Second, in relation to the competing hypothesis addressing question B of the HP, 
I address studies comparing effects of consciously and unconsciously processed stimuli. 
In the method of ‘contrastive analysis’ (Baars, 2007), experimenters compare the 
difference between the effects of a stimuli that is consciously processed and the same 
stimuli when it is unconsciously processed. Studies comparing effects of consciously 
and unconsciously processed stimuli, can be found for example in visual masking 
(Price, 2001) and the binocular rivalry paradigm (Blake & Tong, 2008). 
Consciousness and Function
 In this section I will review the evidence from the area of visual consciousness 
which relates to the competing hypothesis about the functions of consciousness, i.e.  A1. 
Consciousness has the function of mobilisation and integration of brain resources - 
MDM/GWT;  A2. Consciousness probably does not have a function - HOT. However, I 
will first outline some of the claims that have been made about consciousness and 
function, as this will form the basis of the discussion of the evidence in this section. 
Some of these claims are based on thought experiments and some are interpretations of 
evidence. First, some thought experiments.
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 The inverted qualia thought experiment, sometimes referred to as the inverted 
spectrum thought experiment (Block, 1980), is a refined version of the profound 
question that even children sometimes ask, ‘is my red the same as yours?’. Qualia is a 
term philosophers often use to describe phenomenal experiences, and inverted qualia 
refers to an imagined scenario where the qualitative aspects of for example colour are 
inverted. So that - in this scenario - when light with a low wavelength frequency hits 
your retina, you will not experience red, but blue - which normally is associated with 
high wavelength frequencies. However, there would be no possible way of you knowing 
that you experienced blue. This would be your red, and it would make no functional 
difference. If inverted qualia are possible, there would be problems associated with 
ascribing functional properties to mental states. 
 The absent qualia thought experiment (Block, 1980) is similar, but the argument 
proceeds differently. It assumes the possibility of a state, for example my experience of 
hunger, to be functionally the same as another person’s experience of hunger. However, 
the other person’s experience completely lacks the qualitative aspects of my experience 
of hunger. This imagined person who lacks the qualitative aspects of experience, is 
similar to what is referred to as a ‘philosophical zombie’ (Chalmers, 2004). A person 
who can engage in all the complex behaviors you would expect from a conscious 
human, while lacking any conscious experience. 
 There are multitudes of thought experiments like these, that are continuously 
discussed, refuted and elaborated on in philosophical journals. However, the 
metaphysical possibility of the thought experiments mentioned here are disputed 
(Carruthers, 2007; Dennett, 1988; 1991; 1995; Harnad, 1994), as thought experiments 
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like these often represent a priori views on empirical questions (Van Gulick, 2007). 
Neurological conditions that scientists and philosophers link to the themes from these 
thought experiments are therefore of great interest.     
 A condition that has been linked to the absent qualia and philosophical zombie 
thought experiment is blindsight. This phenomenon refers to the fact that many patients 
with lesions to their striate cortices respond to visual stimuli presented in the part of the 
visual field that is retinotopically mapped by the lesioned cortex even though they do 
not consciously see those stimuli (Weiskrantz & Weiskrantz, 1986). Lau and 
Passingham (2006) wrote that this phenomenon is a dissociation between function and 
visual consciousness. McGinn (1991) is in line with this and interpreted the condition as 
implying that a person can function visually as well as any other, without being 
conscious of it. Persaud and Lau (2008) go further and present findings from an N=1 
study, which they claim are evidence for absent qualia in the blind field of a patient with 
a lesion to the occipital lobe. 
 This last point, about absent qualia, is relevant only as long as the evidence 
points to the absence of any functional differences between blindsight and perception as 
it occurs in healthy brains. At first glance, the reports from the neurological studies are 
impressive. Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998) for example, reported that patients 
were unable to tell how many fingers the examining doctor held up as long as it fell into 
the field that was retinotopically mapped by the lesioned area. Despite this the patients 
could, with above chance accuracy, pick up objects placed in the area that is 
retinotopically mapped by the lesioned area, and move them in ways that imply that 
they are to some extent aware of their visual environment. Similarly, the same authors 
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describe patients with larger lesions to the striate cortex, rendering them completely 
cortically blind. This group can also pick up and manipulate objects, which is surprising 
considering the fact that these patients report that they have no visual experience of the 
outside world. 
 Before discussing whether this condition is something resembling a real world 
philosophical zombie, I will outline the mechanisms that have been suggested to 
account for the phenomenon. A number of scientists have proposed an explanation in 
terms of a phylogenetically old neural pathway, and a newer dorsal and ventral neural 
pathway (Milner & Goodale, 1995; Mishkin & Ungerleider, 1983; Ramachandran & 
Blakeslee, 1998). The phylogenetically old pathway goes from the eye to superior 
colliculus in the brain stem, and from there to the cortex, most notably the parietal 
areas. This pathway is associated with orienting reactions (Dean, et. al., 1989; 
Sahibzada, et. al., 1986). The ventral and dorsal pathways are newer, in terms of an 
evolutionary time scale, and project from the eye to the lateral geniculate nucleus, in the 
thalamus - which serves as a relay station - and from there to the primary visual cortex 
where they branch into a ventral and dorsal stream. This dissociation is supported by 
multiple chains of evidence, both from studies of neurological patients (Hodges, et. al., 
1998) and from fMRI studies (Culham, et. al., 2003; Valyear, et. al., 2006; Shmuelof & 
Zohary, 2005). The dorsal stream continues from the visual cortex towards the parietal 
cortex and is mainly concerned with grasping, navigating and other spatial functions. It 
has therefore been referred to as the ‘how’ pathway (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998, 
pp. 56-57). The ventral stream proceeds from the visual cortex to the temporal lobes, 
and is primarily involved in object recognition. Due to this association, the ventral 
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stream has been referred to as the ‘what‘ pathway (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998, 
pp. 56-57). 
 Assuming that the normal input to the ‘how’ and ‘what‘ pathways is severely 
impaired in cortically blind patients, due to the damage to the striate cortex (Weiskrantz 
& Weiskrantz, 1986), scientists have suggested that blindsight occurs partly because the 
phylogenetically old subcortical pathway remains intact (Lyon et. al., 2010; Morris, et. 
al., 1999), hence making orienting responses possible. Others have proposed that 
blindsight could be due to residual function within the primary visual pathway 
(Fendrich, et. al., 1992). One variety of this is the suggestion that some patients with 
this brain lesion might have parts of their ‘how’ pathways intact (Milner, 1998). These 
scientists point to the existence of another neurological condition called ‘Balint’s 
syndrome’ which is caused by a bilateral lesion to the parietal cortex, hence also a 
damage to the ‘how’ pathway (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). These patients can 
identify objects, but experience a form of tunnel vision limited to the area lined up with 
their fovea and often miss by several decimeters when they are asked to focus on a 
visual stimuli, using long periods of time to do something that normal subjects do 
effortlessly. This severe impairment is presented as the opposite of blindsight as the 
navigation aspects of vision are impaired whereas the knowledge and object recognition 
aspects remains.   
 Applying the neurological evidence reviewed here to the dissociation between 
visual consciousness and performance (Lau & Passingham, 2006; McGinn, 1991; 
Persaud & Lau, 2008), it would appear as if the authors proposing this dissociation are 
of the opinion that a lesion to the striate cortex will remove subjective experience from 
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the area that is retinotopically mapped by the lesion. However, another line of evidence 
from research on the common blind spot, and scotomas arising due to lesions in the 
striate cortex, points to the scotomas being perceived as filled in with color, texture and 
form (Ramachandran et. al., 1993; Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). It is hard to 
imagine a scenario where these perceptions do not have an experiential dimension. Not 
only do the perceptions have phenomenality, they also have functional qualities, as the 
‘filling in‘ occurs in accordance with the background (Ramachandran & Gregory, 
1991). Experiments on macaque monkeys show that this effect also can be seen on a 
neuronal level. De Weerd et. al. (1995) reported increased activity in extrastriate 
neurons with receptive fields covering the blindspot, corresponding to the effect of the 
gradual filling in. While another study has reported that some neurons in the striate 
cortex respond selectively to large stimuli covering the blind spot (Komatsu, et. al., 
2000). Thus indicating that some neurons are essential for transmitting information 
concerning large uniform structures covering the blind spot, as well as the absence of 
smaller stimuli in this part of the receptive field.
 In summary, it appears that the effect of filling in the blind field has both a 
phenomenal and functional aspect, which can be seen at both a behavioral and a 
neuronal level. This diverges from the finding reported by Persaud and Lau (2008), 
about the absence of qualia in the blind field. Considering the methods that they used, 
this is not surprising. They showed their participant common definitions of qualia, and 
asked him whether he felt he experienced those in his blind field. According to the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, there are at least four different definitions of 
qualia (Tye, 2013). Some of them are broad and easy to relate to, others are not. 
DISCUSSION OF THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
37
Assuming that the participant is a non-philosopher, this is a possible confounding factor. 
In line with this Persaud and Lau (2008) reported that the participant failed to 
understand the difference between ‘ineffable’ and ‘private’, a disadvantage he shares 
with the author of the current paper. When the methodology is taken into consideration, 
and the finding is viewed in context with other evidence, it appears as if this is a result 
of a fuzzy concept being used as if it was a well defined one. 
 Having established reservations towards the evidence for absent qualia in the 
blindfield, the next question is whether blindsight provides evidence for a dissociation 
between visual consciousness and function, as was proposed by McGinn (1991) and 
Lau and Passingham (2006). The evidence presented in neurological studies sound 
convincing, but there is one important caveat. For the patients with lesions in their 
striate cortices to be able to manipulate objects in their blind field, they need verbal 
prompting in so-called forced choice behavioral tests (Cowey & Stoerig, 1991). They 
are reluctant to make judgements about visual stimuli in their blindfields, and they 
perform poorer than subjects with healthy brains in these tasks (Ramachandran & 
Blakeslee, 1998). Thus, the dissociation between visual consciousness and performance 
can be more precisely thought of as a dissociation between the experience of vision and 
a rudimentary ability to act adaptively. The philosophical zombie of real life presents 
more ambiguity than the one imagined by philosophers, and is not as applicable to 
thought experiments. Which in turn means that this phenomenon does not provide any 
evidence for thinking in terms of a functional and phenomenal dissociation. On the 
contrary, it provides evidence that losing the experience of visual consciousness has real 
implications for the functional aspects of vision. 
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Consciousness and Neural Activity
 In this section I shall review evidence bearing an impact on question B of the 
HP, i.e., what is the connection between subjectivity and the physical systems known as 
brains? The competing hypothesis derived from the theories are,  B1: Consciousness is 
dependent upon activity in the prefrontal cortex (HOT), and B2: Consciousness is an 
emergent property of global neuronal networks (GWT/MDM). 
 Before I outline the findings concerning which brain areas are most active 
during conscious processing of visual information, I will briefly describe two methods 
that are used to study neural activity in visual consciousness, namely visual masking 
and binocular rivalry. Then I will describe the mechanisms underlying stimulus 
competition in binocular rivalry as these mechanisms are assumed to be heavily related 
to the ones at work in visual consciousness. 
 Concerning methods, the basic principle is similar across research paradigms: 
Contrasting the neural activity when a stimulus is processed consciously with the neural 
activity that occurs when a stimulus is processed unconsciously (Baars, 2007). The 
difficult part is establishing that a comparable stimulus is processed unconsciously. In 
visual masking this is accomplished through eliminating the visibility of one brief 
stimulus, referred to as the target, by presenting another brief stimulus, referred to as the 
mask (Price, 2001). In binocular rivalry on the other hand this is accomplished by 
presenting different images to each eye. When the images are presented in this manner, 
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they are presumed to compete for perceptual dominance (Logothetis, et. al., 1996), 
making only one image is visible at a time (Maier, et. al., 2011). 
 With regards to the mechanisms underlying stimulus competition in binocular 
rivalry, it is interesting to note that subjects are unable to wilfully trigger or suppress 
shifts from one eye to the other as this is a largely involuntary process (Blake & Tong, 
2008). However, early visual scientists like Helmholtz (1925) noted that it was possible 
to delay the shifts with focused attention. In addition to the attentional influence, 
perceptual dominance is also influenced by factors including familiarity (LoSciuto & 
Hartley, 1963; Walker, 1978), as well as other affective factors (Alpers, et. al., 2005; 
Alpers & Pauli, 2006; Alpers & Gerders, 2007), indicating that endogenous attentional 
factors influence perceptual dominance (Chong & Blake, 2006). 
 Whether the discrepant monocular patterns compete for awareness due to rivalry 
between pattern representations or rivalry between monocular pathways has been a 
subject of debate (Blake, 2001; Tong, 2001). A hybrid-model (Tong, et. al., 2006), 
integrating views emphasizing low-level reciprocal inhibitory connections with higher 
level excitatory influences, has to a large degree resolved this disagreement (Blake & 
Tong, 2008). 
 This model primarily concerns itself with eye and pattern-based suppression, 
where eye-based suppression is an endogenous effect and concerns an inhibition of the 
visual field stemming from one eye, which in turn is an effect of the perceptual systems 
preference for a single visual stream (Tong, et. al., 2006). By contrast, pattern-based 
suppression is an exogenous effect and refers to an inhibition of the visual stimuli in 
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question. In addition to these presumably unconscious processes, the authors also 
include top down processes to account for attention and perceptual grouping. 
 Specifically, they hypothesized that the neural basis of eye-based and pattern-
based suppression is reciprocal inhibitory connections between monocular neurons (i.e.  
neurons with a preferred eye of origin) and binocular neurons. By contrast, reciprocal 
excitatory connections between contralateral areas are considered a viable account for 
eye based grouping and low-level grouping between monocular neurons with a similar 
pattern preference (Tong, et. al., 2006). The latter includes grouping that happens 
interoculary, as well as pattern-based higher level grouping between binocular neurons. 
Lastly, excitatory feedback projections reduce clutter and are proposed as a mechanism 
for top down effects of attention and feedback effects of perceptual grouping. This view 
can account for the mechanisms of competition between exogenous and endogenous 
factors, with the two of them rivalling their parallel, as well as each other at numerous 
levels in the visual stream (Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Blake & Tong, 2008). 
Continuously modulated by feedback effects from perceptual grouping and attentional 
processes, which in turn influence and are influenced by various states in the observer, 
both cognitive and affective.
 Considered jointly, this theory, with its vast number of reciprocal inhibitory and 
reciprocal excitatory effects - as well as feedback projections bringing about different 
kinds of eye-based and pattern-based suppressions and groupings, in addition to 
attentional effects, fails to present a straightforward picture of where consciousness 
arises. However, the hybrid theory (Tong, et. al., 2006) on which there is agreement 
upon among scientists (Blake & Tong, 2008), sits very well with consciousness being an 
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emergent property of global neuronal networks as argued by the GWT and MDM. It is 
not as compatible with the notion of consciousness being dependent upon higher-order 
thoughts, which arise in the frontal lobe. According to the hybrid model, there are 
various forms of eye-based groupings and pattern-based groupings brought about by 
inhibitory and excitatory reciprocal connections at both a lower level and a higher level. 
Hence, a large proportion the causal chain leading up to something becoming conscious 
appears to have been ascribed to mechanisms located in the lower levels and not the 
higher-order thoughts, which are located in the prefrontal cortex. 
 Attributing a fraction of the causal chain leading up to something becoming 
conscious to lower-level activity in the hybrid model (Tong, et. al., 2006), is also in line 
with the studies on blindsight that show that discrete lesions to the striate cortex can 
render a person cortically blind (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998), indicating that the 
striate cortex is crucial for visual awareness. However, in the striate and prestriate 
cortex, only 14% of the recorded sites fire at an increased rate when a stimulus is 
conscious (Gail et. al., 2004; Keliris, et. al., 2010). On the other hand, studies on blind 
spots have indicated that certain neurons in the striate cortex have receptive fields 
sensitive to large  uniform patterns covering the blind spot, and are more active in 
conditions eliciting ‘filling in’ (Komatsu, et. al., 2000). Other studies have indicated that 
extrastriate neurons are active when conditions eliciting ‘filling in’ are met (De Weerd, 
et. al., 1995). 
 On the other hand, in extrastriate areas, increased activity is only weakly 
correlated with visual consciousness (Leopold & Logothetis, 1996; Maier, et. al., 2007). 
Studies on binocular rivalry indicate the combination of lower level inhibitory 
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connections and higher level excitatory influences which forms the basis of the hybrid 
model (Tong, et. al., 2006). In line with this, some have theorized that the activity in the 
prestriate and striate areas reflect perceptual organization mechanisms that give rise to 
subjective visual consciousness in the temporal lobe where neural activity explicitly 
represents the conscious content (Logothetis, 1998; Blake & Logothetis, 2002). 
 Supporting this proposal are studies associating visual consciousness with 
activity in the inferior temporal cortex and the visual areas of the temporal sulcus 
(Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997). Some however argue that the reciprocal connection 
between these areas and the visual areas of the lateral prefrontal cortex, where neuronal 
populations are known to respond selectively to faces and other intricate perceptual 
stimuli, is a basis for inferring that visual consciousness might arise in the lateral 
prefrontal cortex. This proposal is supported by evidence showing a higher activity 
during conscious awareness, in the lateral prefrontal cortex, as well as temporal areas 
(Panagiotarapoulos, et. al., 2012). Lastly, another study has implicated the mid 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Lau & Passingham, 2006)    
 As a whole, the findings are consistent with the proposal of visual consciousness 
being an emergent property of global networks of neuronal populations (Blake & 
Logothetis, 2002; Panagiotarapoulos, et. al., 2012). Though prefrontal activity is 
implicated in visual consciousness (Lau & Passingham, 2006), the other evidence 
reviewed here indicates that temporal areas are correlated with conscious experience as 
well (Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997). This suggests that prefrontal areas have a role 
within a larger neural network, but not that those areas are on their own sufficient for 
the translation from non-conscious neural processing to phenomenal consciousness.     
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 Discussion of findings
 Having reviewed evidence relating to hypotheses A1, A2 and B1, B2, which 
pertain to questions A (i.e. how is it that at least some organisms (e.g. humans) have 
subjective experiences?) and B (i.e. what is the connection between subjectivity and the 
physical systems known as brains?) of the HP, I now discuss the findings further.
Function and Consciousness
 Considering the competing hypothesis A1 and A2, that make predictions about 
the function of consciousness. The evidence reviewed here does not provide grounds for 
any authorative claims about the function of consciousness. Nor does it present a basis 
for concluding whether consciousness is best understood in terms of function. However, 
it does provide a refutation of the denial of such claims. Based on the comparison of the 
absent qualia/philosophical zombie thought experiments and the research on patients 
with blindsight, I would argue that whether consciousness can be understood in terms of 
its function can be informed by studies showing functional and phenomenal dissociation 
or association. Pointing out the large discrepancy between the imagined philosophical 
zombie and the real world philosophical zombie indicates that whether there is a 
functional and phenomenal dissociation or association is an empirical question. 
 However, if the evidence here did provide authorative grounds for thinking in 
terms of a functional and phenomenal association, this would not in and of itself falsify 
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hypothesis A2, which is held by the HOT. This theory is agnostic towards the question 
of whether consciousness has a function (Lau & Rosenthal), though explicitly presented 
as non-epiphenomenalist (Rosenthal, 2008). Taking this view into consideration, one 
could ask whether any evidence could falsify this hypothesis. If no evidence could 
falsify it, one could question whether it should be regarded as a scientific theory at all. 
 A related theme is conceptual rather than empirical. According to the HOT, 
conscious awareness is crucially dependent upon a higher-order thought that represents 
the person in question as being in a particular mental state (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). 
Conversely, in the GWT and MDM consciousness is seen as global accessibility (Baars, 
2002). This is because global neuronal networks cannot be the cause of consciousness. 
Rather it is consciousness (Dennett, 2001). HOT however relies on a causal relationship 
between higher-order thoughts and consciousness. Placing consciousness at the end of a 
causal chain.      
 As in disagreement with this stance, Dennett (2001) warns us that it is important 
to be wary of the anthropocentric perspective that implicitly assumes consciousness is 
the end product of a causal chain. This is comparable to thinking that apples are the end 
product of apple trees, Dennett argues, and continues to write that the end product of 
apple trees are more apple trees. Any other account than a functional one will not avoid 
this pitfall. This warning echoes Darwin (1838) who wrote, “Why is thought, being a 
secretion of the brain more wonderful than gravity a property of matter? It is our 
arrogance, it is our admiration of ourselves..” (pp. 160-161) in his notebook.
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Neural Activity and Consciousness
 The findings bearing on the competing hypothesis B1, and B2 paint a clearer 
picture than those impacting hypothesis A1 and A2. The evidence supports B2, i.e., 
consciousness is an emergent property of global neuronal networks (GWT/MDM). 
 However, there is evidence that activity in prefrontal areas is correlated with the 
experience of visual consciousness (Lau & Passingham, 2006). But as I have argued 
earlier, temporal areas are also strongly correlated with the experience of visual 
consciousness (Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997). It appears as if the HOT does not sit as 
well with these findings as the GWT and MDM. 
 To develop this theme further it is important to draw a distinction between 
sufficient and necessary conditions for visual consciousness. Some low level visual 
areas appear to be necessary for visual experience, such as the striate cortex where a 
large bilateral lesion can make a person cortically blind (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 
1998). These areas however, might not in themselves be sufficient. If we return to the 
HOT, it claims that a state is conscious due to representational relation between a 
higher-order thought and a mental state (Rosenthal, 1990). This higher-order thought 
crucially arises in the prefrontal cortex (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). According to this view 
an intact prefrontal cortex is necessary for visual consciousness. 
 In line with this, Lau and Rosenthal (2011) argue that many studies link frontal 
lobe lesions to disturbances in various responses to visual stimuli (e.g. Barcelo, et. al., 
2000; Guitton & Buchtel, 1985; Kennard, 1939). However , these lesions do not abolish 
awareness completely. The only study referred to by Lau and Rosenthal (2011) showing 
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this effect is a study on monkeys, where the parietal lobe has been removed in addition 
to the frontal lobe (e.g. Nakamura & Mishkin, 1986). Another study that these authors 
refer to, shows impaired meta-cognitive ability (e.g. poorer stimulus discrimination 
abilities and lower reported levels of visual awareness) in visual awareness tasks. This 
effect was seen with lesions to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Rounis et. al., 2010) 
that were temporarily induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). This is 
interesting, although not an indicative for prefrontal areas being a necessary condition 
for visual awareness. The findings presented by Rounis et. al., (2010) could just as well 
be interpreted as support for hypothesis B2, something that would be compatible with 
the evidence pointing to the relevance of other brain areas as well for visual 
consciousness. 
 Summarising this discussion, with the current evidence it is  presently 
impossible to decisively conclude on the nature of the connection between subjectivity 
and brains. However, hypothesis B2 show more promise than hypothesis B1 with this 
regards to this.   
Implications of Findings
 Any paper that discusses theoretical solutions to the HP should also include 
some limitations. Firstly, the evidence reviewed here does not close the explanatory gap 
that is addressed by the HP. This was not the intention of this paper, which aims instead 
to provide an evaluation of some influential theoretical approaches to the HP. 
DISCUSSION OF THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
47
 Consistent with this, there are limitations to this paper that were evident from the 
outset as it rests on the assumption that a naturalistic account of consciousness might be 
possible. Contrary to this position, there are philosophers and scientists who think that a 
naturalistic account is impossible. These authors have metaphysical beliefs about 
consciousness ranging from materialism (e.g. Pinker, 1997) to mysterianism (e.g. 
McGinn, 1991). When the foundation of consciousness is a subject to debate, the 
accounts of of it could be wrong at a more fundamental level than what was within the 
scope of this paper.  
 However - according to Van Gulick (2007), various forms of functionalism are 
the most commonly held positions among philosophers with regards to the nature of 
mental states. Multiple sources also make reference to a surge of interest in the 
scientific study of consciousness (e.g. Blackmore, 2010; Dennett, 2001; Mind-Science 
Foundation, 2013; Velmans & Schneider, 2007). Considered jointly, this makes whether 
consciousness can be explained scientifically an open question. 
 Though this paper proceeded from that assumption, the theories discussed in this 
paper remain a small subset of scientific theories of consciousness. A fact that limits the 
application of the points that are argued here.  
 In line with this, I have not proved that the solutions provided by the GWT or 
MDM are correct. However, this paper outlines some central problems with the HOT, 
indicating that the theoretical solution outlined by this theory is less compatible with 
empirical data than the theoretical solution provided by the GWT and the MDM. Based 
on this, I have argued that there are good reasons not to adopt a priori assumptions of 
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thinking in terms of phenomenal and functional dissociation. I have also argued that 
there are good reasons to think that consciousness is linked to activity in global 
neuronal networks, rather than linked to one specific area. 
 A further clarification of the position I have argued is Dennett’s (2001) warning 
about the anthropocentric fallacy associated with viewing consciousness as the end of a 
causal chain. Activity in global neuronal networks cannot be the cause of consciousness. 
Rather it is consciousness. HOT which does not explain consciousness in terms of 
function appears to be vulnerable to this fallacy.  
 However, a number of philosophers claim that functional explanations are 
unable to address phenomenal consciousness or qualia (e.g. Chalmers, 2004; Block, 
1980). Some of the arguments against functionalism are thought experiments which 
make strong a priori claims (Van Gulick, 2007). In this paper I have argued against such 
claims and suggested that a functional and phenomenal dissociation is an empirical 
question. 
 This argument was intended as a critique of certain empirical claims rather than 
as a direct contribution to the qualia-functionalism debate, which is philosophical rather 
than scientific and therefore beyond the scope of this paper. However – some aspects of 
this debate should be considered in relation to the theories presented in this paper. The 
interpretive dimensions on which this dispute plays out varies between: (1) how 
functionalism should be interpreted, (2) which real features that can be ascribed to 
qualia, (3) and what the appropriate standard for explanatory success is (Van Gulick, 
2007). All of the theories discussed in this paper have their own assumptions built into 
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them in terms of the interprative dimensions above - something that was touched upon 
when the theories’ stance on the HP was discussed. In line with this, the theories might 
meet their own standard for explanatory success without meeting standards that are 
deemed appropriate by other theories.
 Hence, the theories discussed here might have assumptions and standards built 
into them that are simply incompatible with each other. However, all the theories 
discussed here purport to be scientific theories that make specific empirical predictions. 
If this is the case, the problem of incompatability should not arise. Should the 
differences between the theories discussed here be the result of an incompatability, this 
would not in itself make the discussion and its conclusions erroneous. On the contrary, 
the testing of different assumptions and standards could contribute to clarify and 
elaborate on which of these assumptions that will enable scientists to capture the elusive 
concept of phenomenal consciousness while avoiding violation of scientific criteria.
 With regards to this, I have argued that understanding consciousness as an 
emergent property of global access/global neuronal networks shows promise. As 
opposed to understanding consciousness as crucially dependent upon a representational 
relation between a higher-order thought and a mental state. 
 On the other hand, one might argue that these accounts of consciousness are far 
removed from the ’raw feels’ of viewing for example a birch forest, alive with sunlight 
and bright yellow colours during fall. The reply from Dennett (2001), who will serve as 
an example of a functionalist (note that there are many other versions), would be that 
the subjective qualities of this experience only accessible to the individual must be 
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broken down in complex dispositional traits distributed in space and time in the brain and 
analyzed in a functional manner.
 Regardless of how matter-of-fact that explanation sounds in comparison with what it is 
trying to explain, it is an explanation, or at least a recipe for an explanation. Though the 
explanatory gap still exists, this perspective on consciousness provides an opening for 
examining and understanding parts of the phenomenon. 
 While the theories discussed here provided an opening for understanding the 
phenomenon, there are many theoretical solutions that were not included in this paper. 
These theories might fit the evidence equally as well, or maybe even better than the 
theories discussed here. Consistent with this, it is reasonable to assume that theories of 
consciousness will become more detailed, when better brain imaging techniques and 
research paradigms are discovered. 
 Considering the relatively low resolution of brain imaging techniques, a 
suggestive comparison is the group of astronomers led by Lowell (1906). At the turn of 
the 19th century they were convinced that there were canals on Mars, indicating the 
existence or former existence of intelligent life on this planet (Lowell, 1904). They 
spent considerable time gazing through telescopes, and drew elaborate maps of the 
canal network (Sagan & Fox, 1975). For a time, canals on mars were the established 
opinion, until perceptual scientists pointed to optical illusion effects, and the fact that it 
is generally easier to see what you want to see with coarsely grained data (MariaLane, 
2006). This issue was resolved in favor of no canals on mars in 1965, with the images 
from Mariner 4 (Gerstbach, 2003).
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 Studying the neural correlates of consciousness is of course an important project, 
but so was establishing whether or not there were canals on mars. The point is not to 
ridicule Lowell’s research group, as their project was important at that time. Rather, my 
goal is to illustrate that coarsely grained data warrants a cautious interpretation; strong 
claims about consciousness are at this point likely to be false.     
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